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BALLANCE OF EUROPE: OR, An ENQUIRY into THE Respective DANGERS Of giving the *Spanish MONARCHY* TO THE EMPEROUR As well as to King PHILIP, WITH *The Consequences that may be expected from Either.*

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ANSWER

13th Feb 1887

THE
Ballance of EUROPE,
 OR,
An ENQUIRY
 INTO

The respective Dangers of giving the Spanish Monarchy to the Emperour, as well as to King Philip, &c.

TH E Peace of *Europe* for this last Eight Years of the War, seem'd to Depend but upon one main and capital Article, (*viz.*) The Surrendering or Evacuating *Spain* by King *Philip*, to King *Charles III.* and this having brought the Debates about it, upon any *Treaties* that were offer'd, within a narrower Compass than formerly, we found the last Conferences at *Gertruydenberg* confin'd to this short Head; what Security should be given on one Hand, and what Equivalent on the Other, for the effectual Evacuating the *Spanish Dominions* by King *Philip*? And upon their not

Agreeing in this Point, that Treaty or Meeting broke up, and the War went on purely on this Head : If any Man equired what we Fought for in this War, the Answer was short, we Fought for *Spain*. All the Pretences of this War, all the Manifestoes, Defences, or Arguments on either Side, turn'd upon this Point only, The Evacuating *Spain*, and the Security for the Performance : We could ask little of the King of *France* but what he readily enough agreed to, but this, and had this been heartily either Proposed on one Hand, or Consented to on the Other, the War had been at an End long ago.

But behold when we thought our Peace as good as Concluded, and that whenever we pleased but to offer a Proportion or Equivalent to King *Philip*, we might at our Pleasure put an End to the Strife ; a New and unexpected Difficulty is risen up, of so perplexing a Nature, so odd and intricate in its Circumstances, that even, tho' the King of *France* should come and say to us, that his Grandson was ready to Evacuate *Spain*, to lay down his Pretensions, and give up the Possession of the Crown, as we formerly Desired and Demanded, we are now uncertain whether we had best take it or no, and if we should accept it, are still more Doubtful to whom we should give it, or in brief what we should do with it.

This New Doubt arises from Two Incidents which have Intervened since the said Conferences at *Gertruydenberg*, and which humane Prudence could then have no Prospect of. First, The Death of the Emperour *Joseph*, Eldest Branch of the House of *Austria*, and Secondly, The Election of *Char. III.* (whom we called King of *Spain*, and in whose Name all this War has been carry'd on) to the Imperial Crown, by the Stile of *Charles VI. Emperour of Germany*.

By the Consequence of these unexpected Events, *Europe* is now acted by New Councils; differing and inconsisting Interests rise up in the Affairs of *Christendome*, the Dangers of heap-ing up Power upon the House of *Austria*, which may in time be superior to the rest of *Europe*, begin to appear formidable and frightful; the Nations call to mind the fatal Greatness of *Cha. V. Philip II. and Ferdinand*, whose Power threaten'd *Europe* with universal Bondage for several Ages, and whole formidable Strength took it's rise and beginning only in the Con-junction of the Empire with the Dominions of *Spain*, in the Person of *Cha. V.* which, though all the Electors consented to, Five of them had Fifty Years Leisure to repent of.

It is not the least Unhappiness in the present Dispute, that the several Parties are divided in their Thoughts, to whom they shall allot

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the Spanish Monarchy : But the Competitors are so few, and their Circumstances so equal, that the Question returns, even upon a Point which seems very hazardous to us all, and indeed looks at first sight, very frightfully (*viz.*) Whether, after all the Blood that has been spilt, Money spent, Detolation made, Losses sustain'd, and Perplexity suffer'd, by the Confederated Part of Europe, to gain this Spanish Monarchy from King Philip to King Charles, it shall not now appear more for the publick Safety and Interest to give it to King Philip, whom they have been fighting against, than to K. Charles, whom they have been fighting for : And though this might look like a severe Satyr upon the Wisdom and Councils of the Confederates in general, who have with such Eagerness and Application been thus long Fighting, and spending their Blood and Treasure to pull that down, which it appears their Interest to set up, and *Vice Versa*, to keep that low, which they have fought so vigorously to set up; I mean the new Emperour : Yet all this is accounted for, by the New and Unforeseen Accident of the Late Emperour's dying without Heirs Male, and the Necessity, in order to establish the other Affairs of Europe, of electing King Charles III. Emperour of Germany in his stead.

This Event has in many Cases alter'd the face of Affairs, and hustling, as we may say, the Interests of *Europe* together, has placed many of them in differing Positions from what they were before : So that New Councils, New Dangers, New Methods of Safety, New Faces, and a New Situation of Affairs, appear in many Parts of the Confederacy, to some the Dangers of setting the Crown of *Spain* on the Head of the Emperour seem very great and terrible, much greater than those of setting it on the Head of King *Philip*; and to some just the contrary : To some the Dangers of the *Austrian* Greatness are nearer, and those of *Bourbon* more remote ; to others the Greatness of the House of *Bourbon* are nearer and more affecting, and those of the Emperor or House of *Austria* growing too powerful are more remote, and less affrighting than that of *Bourbon*. And as the respective Branches of the Confederacy are more or less affected with these Views, so they are more or less interrested in the present Debate, whether on one Side or another.

In the mean Time, this Change of Affairs gives a New Turn to the whole Negotiation of the Peace ; and some of those, who before were clear in the Prosecution of the War, till the whole *Spanish* Monarchy should be restored to the August House of *Austria*, find Reason, even from the same upright and just Foundation

(viz.) The Safety and Peace of Europe, to be now quite of another Mind ; believing, that if all the Spanish Monarchy was to be given up to the Emperour, the Ballance of Power, so much aim'd at, would be effectually destroyed in Europe ; And that they should be so far from establishing the Safety and the Peace they seek for, that in a few Years they should be obliged to begin a New War in Europe, to succour the Oppressed Princes, who would be crushed and over-powered by the Neighbourhood and Encroachments of the Austrian Power, which by this Conjunction would be made too great for them.

On the other hand, some, who have receiv'd such terrible Ideas of the French Greatness, that no Dangers that are remote can equal their Concern for, are not only quite of another Opinion, but are too apt to reproach the other with being unjust to their former declared Principles, and with being brought over to French Councils, managed by French Influence, and the like.

The Author of these Sheets acknowledges so much of his own Sentiments before-hand, that he thinks both these may be in some measure wrong, in the several Steps they have taken in this great Affair, but more especially that both are wrong, in the severe Reflections they cast upon one another, and the Censures they make

make, which neither one way or other seem to open or explain the Matter, but only to exasperate Parties, and increase the unhappy Divisions with which this Nation has too long already been perplex'd, And not only so, but that these Heats are more especially Fatal at this Time, as they may not only affect our Parties and disturb our Private Peace, but as they make those Divisions National, and cause them to spread abroad among the Confederates and Allies to make them jealous of and uneasy to one another. Nor is this all yet ; but the Consequences of those Jealousies and Uneasiness have a natural tendency to break and blow up the present Grand Alliance against *France*, upon which, and the right Application of every Part and Party to the Interest of the whole, depends the general Safety at this time ; since *France* being now brought to a Willingness for Peace, and that upon Conditions in many Parts very advantageous to the Confederates ; Yet we find his Power not so entirely broken, but that, if our Misunderstandings and Uneasiness at Home, should be carry'd on to any Length, fatal to the present good Understanding among the Allies, on which the Safety of the whole Confederacy does so much depend, and if any Rupture among us should unhappily fall out, she would be able to take hold of it, and make such Advantages thereof, as would

bid fair to restore her to all that Excess of Power, which had made her so formidable to Europe; and by Consequence the End of these long Wars, which is now so happily in View, would be effectually disappointed.

It cannot be an unprofitable Observation to our Allies abroad, or to our People at home, to remind them, that *France* is by this long War so far reduced, as that the just Occasion for which the War was begun (*viz.*) The Exorbitance of his Power, seem'd to be effectually removed. The Concessions made by the King of *France* at the late Treaty, are a sufficient Evidence of this ; and the Conditions of the late Preliminaries are so full of the several Countries Cities, Towns, and strong Places, which *France* is willing to give up, as will reduce the *French* Greatness to a Limitation, *Europe* would have but little or no reason for the Future to call Exorbitant.

But should any such Breach among the Confederates happen, which God forbid, as should remove the Fears and Apprehensions of their Power, so that *France* should fall off from these Concessions, and the Confederates should not so far agree, as to carry on this War, or perhaps not be in a Condition, it would be a Question few would venture to solve, when it may be likely to reduce *France* to such Concessions again.

It is to be hoped, the Sense of the Danger of Europe in such a Case, will move the Confederates to more Noble Sentiments, than such as may have these fatal Consequences; But as no Caution can be too great in such a Case, so no Man that is truly sensible, how busy some among us are to provoke to the Disagreement aforesaid, and what Hopes they entertain of the Success of it, can avoid being filled with Fear, and say every needful Thing to prevent it.

Also the Author of this Tract thinks it is a Caution every Party ought to accept from him with Candour and Kindness; and that they who pretend to the least Concern for the Safety and Tranquillity of Europe, the Prosperity of the Protestant Interest, or the Good of their Native Country of Britain, would do well to reflect, whether the present Humour, which too much prevails among us, of opposing the General Peace because of their Prejudices at the Party concerned in making it, is not a thing of such ruinous Consequence, as may in the end prevent our having any Peace at all, or at least disable us from obtaining so good Conditions as at this time may be obtained.

I have heard some People run so great a Length in Opposing the Steps now taking towards a general Treaty of Peace, as to talk of Ways and Means to be proposed in England, among private Persons, to enable the Dutch to

carry on the War without us ; I say, to be proposed, because I cannot but think such People, if any such there are, will look before them, ere they take such a Step, and Consider well the Danger of it to themselves, there being generally Speaking, a large Interval between the Forming and the Executing such dangerous Attempts as these.

But such People have also another thing to Consider, and which when they come to look into, will no doubt Check their furious Zeal for the Confusion of Europe, and this is, that they will find the Dutch understand their Interest better, and have a clearer Sense of things, than to embark on so weak a View, and with so Empty a Project of Support, as the warmth of a few private People would be, and who as soon as Detected in their New Scheme, would be Treated at Home as Rebels and Traitors, even by a Government, which nevertheless would be Assistant to the same Nation, which these would pretend to Support in an illegal and irregular Way : But of this I shall speak more largely when I come to the Particulars.

But to return to the present Case, (*viz.*) The new Debates as to the Interest of Disposing the Spanish Monarchy, on this unforeseen Event of the Death of the Emperour, it is observeable that till now, it had been a Question only between the King of France and his Grandson,

King Philip, on the one Side, and the Confederates on the other ; who should possess the Monarchy of Spain. Nay it had not been a Question there either, but the King of France had Conceded it to Char. III. by the Preliminaries adjusted at the Hague, and after at Gertruydenberg, only Contending for some little hold of it, that his Grandson King Philip, might not fall a Rent Charge upon his Hands, and become a Refuge in his Court among other Sovereigns, that have fled thither for Sanctuary ; but might remain a King, tho' but with a small Dominion, little better than the Name ; for Sicily and Sardinia, was the Sum of his Demands, with the few Spanish Towns on the Coast of Tuscany, which they afterwards received from too.

But upon this New Occasion of the Death of the Late Emperour Joseph, the Dispute hath extended it self into divers Branches ; and it is now an Enquiry among the Confederates too, and perhaps an Enquiry more Difficult to be Answer'd than it was before ; to whom shall the Kingdom of Spain be allotted by a Treaty of Peace ?

I shall as exactly as Publick Notice of such things will permit, give a short Sketch of the Opinions of other People about it, and then subjoin what occurs to immediate Oblervation, Fortifying it with such Reasons, as the Circumstances

stances of the Case may offer ; and allowing as due a Weight, and as just a Regard, to the several Arguments used in this Case, as I would have allowed to my own.

First, Some People are positive for giving the Spanish Monarchy to the Emperour Ch. VI. without taking any Umbrage at his Greatness ; they say the Circumstances of the Empire differ from what they were in the Days of *Char. the Vth*. That the rest of the World are in a better Condition to curb him in an undue Exercise of his Power. That the vast Extent of his Dominions will be so far from giving him an Exorbitance of Power, that they render that Power Unweildy, and a Burthen to it self ; That the Dominions ly so separated and extended, unable to Help and Relieve one another, that like a Whale among Islands, or in Shoals, when struck by the Harpineers, he beats himself to Pieces for want of Sea Room. That in the Days of *Char. Vth* neither *Holland* was a State, or *France* in any Figure; nor was there any Naval Power Superior to the Emperour ; whereas now should the Emperour attack any of them all, either *France*, or *Holland*, or *Britain*, are able to cut off his Communication with the *Indies* ; nay even with *Spain* it self, and with all the Islands ; so that the Power of the Empire is nothing to what it then was. This and much more, make up what they allege for their Opinion.

Secondly, Others are for giving Spain to the Emperour meerly because it shou'd not come into the Hands of the House of Bourbone. They know by general Notion, that it is an allow'd Principle, and a Fundamental, in the Case of the present War, that the Spanish Monarchy must not whatever comes of it, fall into the Hands of France. They know no Difference between Lewis XIV, and his Grandson Philip; they know very well the absolute Command that Great Monarch has over his Subjects of every Degree, not excepting his Grandson Philip; they know that mighty Obligation which Philip V. is under to his Grandfather; that to him he Owes his being, Called to the Spanish Throne; that his Grandfather not only set him up, but has kept him in Possession of that Monarchy almost at the Expence of his own; at least at the Expence of many Thousands of his Subjects, and many Millions of his Treasure: He must be Ingrateful to the highest Degree, if he can forget such Obligations, the greatest that one Man can heap upon another; and enhanced with such Particulars to make it yet greater, that no Prince ever did more for another, even almost to his own Ruin, and to the Ruin of his Subjects; and therefore they cannot but think the Persons and Interests will ever be the same. That Philip V. will ever own his Crown to his Grandfather, and be Subjected so far to his Rules, Ordering

desiring, and Requests ; that as it respects us the Confederates, it must be reckoned the same thing Effectually and Eventually, to give the Spanish Monarchy to King Philip, as to give it to the King of France ; and for this Reason, they are for the Concession of the Whole, to be made to the Emperour ; not but that they are Convinced it may be Dangerous so to do, but because they think it is the least Mischief of the Two, and that the other way it must Inevitably come to France.

Thirdly, Others are neither for giving it to one or other, but Reviving the Old and Exploded Notion of a Partition, are for Dividing it, some to one Hand some to another ; so by that means to weaken the Whole, and take from Europe the Apprehension of Danger, from it, one way or other. They alledge that if it should be given to King Philip, there is a manifest Danger to Europe, from the strict Union there is between him and his Grandfather the King of France ; that they will be always in one and the same Interest, tho' they should enter into never so many Engagements to the Contrary ; that there are many concurring Accidents which may serve to Unite them more closely than ever, and sometimes may so fall out, that may, in Time, Revolve them into one Hand, as they are already in one Interest ; that the Risque is too great while under but a bare Possibility, that Europe

can never be Easy, while such Possibility is in the remotest View, and that the Confederates having now the Power in their Hands, ought to deliver themselves and their Posterity from the Apprehensions, and even from the Possibility of such a Consequence. On the other Hand they tell us, that to give the Dominions of *France* to the Emperour, is full of Dangers, equal in Consequence, and nearer in View than the other. Nay, tho' the Evil apprehended of an Union with *France* should come to pass: They call to mind the formidable Greatness of the House of *Austria* in the Days of *Charles V.* what the Dangers to the Protestant Princes were, even in his Reign, and afterwards in the Reign of *Ferdinand II.* one of his Successors: They look upon the History of the Low-Country Wars, and the Cruelty of the Duke *D' Alva* in the *Netherlands*; where 18000 People were in Twelve Years space executed by the Hand of the Common Hang-man, they look into the Massacres of the Protestants in *Bohemia*, in *Germany*, and in *Italy*; and at last to the Attempt made by *Ferdinand II.* to cause all the Protestant Princes in *Germany* to restore the Ecclesiastick Immunities Possess'd by them from the Reformation. They infer from hence, that to trust the same Power into the hands of the same Politick Person, is to lay the Foundation of the Practise; they represent to themselves the Affairs of Religion in a much weaker Posture

now, on the Side of *Germany* than it was then, and indeed, in this they have too much Reason, as I shall Examine more at large by and by ; and that the Attempt being once made, there is not a sufficient Strength to Oppose them ; and for this, and many other Reasons too long to be Inserted here, they Insist upon it, that it must be very Dangerous, to put the Dominions of *Spain* into such Hands. From either of these Extremes, they alledge the only safe Medium is to be taken, which is a Partition, and they fill the World with the variety of their Schemes upon this Head, with their Reasons for them, and the State of the Affairs of *Europe* upon such a Foot; alledging that by such a Division only, the Peace of *Europe* is to be Preserved, and the Power taken out of the Hands of either Party, to Oppress or Grow too Great for the rest ; it would be too long, and exclude the more Profitable Observations, which we shall fill up this Tract with, to give here the Variety of Schemes the Projection of this Partition lays down, as the Ground-Plat of the Publick Peace ; it may suffice, that they go all upon this main Point : That the *Spanish* Monarchy should thereby be rendered so weak, that to whose Share soever it may fall, it may not be such an Addition of Strength to them, as to make them too Powerful for the rest of *Christendom*, a Foundation no Question formed upon right Principles : Whe-

ther a Partition of the *Spanish* Dominions be the only necessary Consequence, or the only effectual Means to bring that End proposed to pass, or no, is a Question to be treated of by itself.

I have endeavoured here with all possible Clearness to lay down, what every Opinion among us pretend to desire, and what Reasons they give for their several Schemes ; but I cannot dismiss this Part of my Work, till I have observed a little upon the Deficiency of every one of these. *For Example;*

First, The People who are for giving the Dominions of *Spain* to King *Philip* do not dwell much upon the particular Security which may be given for the Ease of the Confederates against *France*, and against the Possibility of *Spain* being once united to *France* by right of Devolution, or being under the Influence of *France* in Matters of Council and Commerce ; nor do they tell us what is, or what is not sufficient for the Confederates to depend upon, as Security in such a Case ; which, as it seems not to be a Thing impracticable in it self, so neither was it unnecessary to be annex'd to their Opinion of giving *Spain* to a Branch of the House of *Bourbon*.

2dly, Those who are for giving *Spain*, with all the Dominions thereto belonging, to the Emperor, have, with all their Reasons for doing so,

to, and the Dangers of leaving it to the Possession of France, forgotten in the first Place, to let us know how they intend to get them out of the Possession of Philip V. They omit nothing that the English and Dutch, at the First Entrance upon this last Breach, publickly own'd and acknowledg'd King Philip, and sent Ambassadors to compliment him upon his Accession to the Spanish Throne : That by this Act they led the People of Spain to a general receiving him, and giving their Faith, Homage, and Allegiance to him, as their lawful King. What such an Action would have been called by us, had the King of France done it, I forbear to inquire into here. The Case for which it is mentioned here, is only to note, that having encouraged the Spanish Nation by this Proceeding to receive and crown King Philip, no doubt it has been the more difficult from that very Occasion, to bring them back again at Pleasure to swear Allegiance to another, meerly because we think fit to set him up and support him.

The Possession King Philip has thus gain'd, has been twice, if not, as we may say, three times unsuccessfully attempted ; and though that Monarch has been obliged two several Times to abandon his Capital, and fly from Madrid ; yet Heaven has as often seem'd to favour his Cause, and the Confederates have been in their

Turns by plain Force obliged to quit the Field, and retreat even withing the Gates of *Barcelona*. Nor has this been without infinite Expence of Blood in two Battles ; the First at *Almanza*, where the whole Confederate Army was overthrown with such a Slaughter, and so compleat a Victory, as exceeds, in Proportion to the Number of Troops, any Battel of this Age, not *Blenheim* it self excepted ; The other at *Brihuega* and *Villa Viciosa* ; which may be called but one Action ; where, whatever Pretences Count *Staremburg* made to a Victory, 'tis evident the Confederate Army was in a Manner ruin'd, Count *Staremburg* obliged to quit the whole Kingdom of *Aragon*, and made his Retreat not into *Catalonia* only, but as was said above, to the very Walls of *Barcelona* ; where if he was not besieged and driven to Sea, both he and King *Charles III.* with all their Court and Adherents, it was more owing to the ill Condition of the Spanish Affairs, than any Pointe they were in to defend themselves ; having neither Troops to fight, Magazines of Arms or Ammunition, Provisions to feed them, or Money to pay them ; and this for five Months after their Retreat : So that Count *Staremburg* was heard to say, That if the Duke de *Vendosme* should attack him in *Barcelona*, he must be obliged to kill all the Horses, and salt them up for the Garrisons Provision, or starve ; And that

that if a Supply of Provisions should be sent him, unless he had Troops also to encamp without the Walls, the Horse must all be shipped for *Minorca*, or they would eat one another, since it could not be supposed the Magazines of Forrage, necessary for their Subsistence in a Siege, could be preserv'd from the Enemies Bombs.

It is true that a general Answer to this Inquiry is given by saying, That to push the War in *Flanders* effectually, is to reduce *France* to a Necessity of evacuating *Spain*; that the Road to *Madrid* lies thro' the Gates of *Paris*; and that as this is the only Step which reduced the King of *France* to make such Concessions as he has already made, so it is a Proof that there is an effectual Method to bring him to a Necessity of giving up all the rest. This indeed has been the popular Reason given for carrying on the War so long as it has been; and is the Argument now made use of to justify the Breaking off of the Last Treaty, when *France* came in to the evacuating *Spain*, and offer'd a Sum of Money towards carrying on the War against King *Philip*, if he insisted upon his Refusal to quit it. But whether, when we talk of these things with so much Assurance, we are not a little guilty of what in our Enemies we call *The Gasconade*, ought also to be consider'd; since, instead of being at the Gates of *Paris*, we have
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pass'd another Campaign with taking one Paltry Town ; have lost a small Army by Deser-tion of our Troops. And tho' in Spain we have sent above 20000 Men for Succours to King Charles, they are now insulted in their Intrenchments, and are not able to act upon the Offen-sive in any one Article.

So that these People seem to be over forward in giving the Kingdoms of Spain out of the Pos-session of K. Philip by a Treaty, while they do not first tell us how we shall get it out of his hand by a War.

Nor do they consider the Confederates as in the least weaken'd or exhausted by the War. I care not to say in publick, what I think of our Difficulties, and how ill able we are in this Na-tion to carry on the War any farther ; but it need not be an Offence to any one to have it said, That the French are not the only Nation in Europe who stand in need of a Peace, espe-cially as Masters go at home ; which leads me by the Hand to an Observation of an unhappy Circumstance in England, which more parti-cularly justifies those who appear earnest for a Peace (*viz.*) That those very People who ap-pear most forward against a Peace, and seem to abound in their own Reasons for it, are yet the very People who, by discouraging Loans, running down Stocks, and ruining the National Credit, endeavour most effectually to disable the Queen from carrying on the War.

3dly, To come to the Deficiencies of their Schemes, who are for the Partition of the Spanish Monarchy in general: I cannot here enter upon particular Objections against their several Schemes, because I have not enumerated those Schemes, nor is it much to the purpose so to do: But the main Objections I meet with are (1) That the Emperour will not be brought to accept of such a Treaty; and you must break in upon the Treaty of Grand Alliance to compel him to do so: And (2) As Matters now stand, you will never come to a right Agreement of such a Partition, because France and King Philip will never part with the Indies, nor can the Emperour have them without Old Spain annex'd.

Having just touch'd upon these things, with all humble Diference to the Opinions of every side, which, according the best of my Understanding, I have laid fairly down; I shall now lay down, in Terms that may be intelligible to the meanest Understanding, a true and impartial State of the present Affairs of Europe: How and in what manner a Peace may be established with Safety and Honour to the whole, and upon what Foot the several Powers now engag'd in a long and bloody War, may be brought to what we so often talk of, (*viz.*)

A Ballance of Europe.

The Reader one would think, need not be told that *Europe* here is to be taken in a strict Sense, for those Nations of *Europe* who are concern'd in the present War with *France*, on one side or other ; without concerning our selves with the Affairs of *Sweden* or *Masstov*, *Hungary* or the *Turks*, which tho' it is True they are in *Europe*, yet as this is the governing Part of *Europe*, it has been a Word Legitimated to this Part by the Custom of the Times.

The present War as it respects our Discourse, is carried on by five principal Heads of Confederacy ; the King of *France*, and the King of *Spain* in *Italy*, known by the Name of the Two Crowns make one Side. The Emperour, *Bri-tain*, and the States General make the other, and it needs not for any Light that it will give to our Discourse, that we should enumerate the Kings of *Portugal* and *Prussia*, the Duke of *Savoy*, or the Electors of the Empire on one Side, or the Empire of *Mexico* and *Peru* on the other, only as Accidents to our Discourse.

It is a certain Truth, That all the Confederates have Exerted themselves in this War with an uncommon Vigour.

France has given convincing Proofs to the World, how well Furnished she was for the

Government of *Europe*, and that she had a Foundation of Strength sufficient to support the highest Prospect she had in View of Universal Monarchy ; since she has struggled single Handed against the strongest and best cemented Confederacy that was ever known in this, or in any Part of the World. That she has been so far from receiving any Assistance from her Confederacy with *Spain*, that she has twice by her proper Forces, retrived *Spain* from the Hands of the Victorious Arms of the Confederates, and given Victory to K. Philip, Restoring him twice to his Throne, from which he was evidently Driven without any View of Recovery, but by the Arms of *France*. On both these Occasions *France* has ravish'd Victory from the Confederates, Beaten them by fair Fighting out of the Field, and Driven them back, as is Noted before, to the Gates of *Barcelona*, taking from them after the First Battel, the City of *Tortosa*, and after the Last, the strong Fortress of *Gironne*.

This is a convincing Justification of the Confederates, for their Undertaking this War, since it proves beyond any Objection, that it was highly necessary to prevent the Encrease of such a Power, which in it's Progress so evidently Threatened *Europe* with the Loss of her Liberty, and with erecting a Sovereign, who visibly aim'd at the Universal Monarchy of this Part of the World.

However, the Confederacy has been also built upon such solid Foundations, so well knit together, their Affairs so heartily push'd on in the Field, and the French have received so many Blows: That in two Treaties, (viz.) The First at the Hague, where Preliminaries were settled, and the Last at Gertruydenberg, where the Security only of Performance was Discussed. The King of France came so low; as to offer to restore to the Confederates more in Flanders, than was ever Demanded by any former Treaty, and Proportion in other Parts, and in particular, condescended to the Evacuation of all Spain, and tho' he declined to cause his Troops to Act against his own Grandson, as what he esteemed in the highest Degree Dishonourable, and as the French said Unnatural, yet he came so low, as to abandon entirely his Grandson, to Engage on the Faith and Honour of a King, not to assist him Directly or Indirectly, and not resting in that, Proposed to Assist the Confederates with Money, in Order to force him to Evacuate the laid Dominions of Spain to King Charles III.

What particular Evil Planet influenced the Affairs of the Confederates at that time, that they should shut their Eyes against such Proposals as these, I am not Conjurer enough to determine; indeed it appears to me as if the whole was under some Maligoity not yet understood. No doubt Providence in Justice to the Sins of

Europe, closed the Understandings of the Politicians of those Times, that they could not see the things which belonged to their Peace ; for after all these Concessions, they rejected the Proposal as *Unsatisfactory*, and ventur'd the Success of another War, (as we may call it) rather than to put an End so Glorious, to the Troubles of *Europe*.

It was not many Days after this, when *Heaven*, who had first (as on may lawfully doubt) Infatuated them to reject Peace, declared against them in the War, and the Confederate Army suffer'd a Disgrace at *Bribeaga* in *Spain*. This was followed with a Battle, so far from being an Advantage to us on that Side, that it was followed with the Loss of all the Conquests made in the Beginning of the Campaign, and with the Retreat of the Confederates to the Walls of *Barcelona*. This encouraged the Enemy to reject your Proposals of any kind, sue no more for Peace, and on every Side to threaten you with an Offensive War : Nor were they behind Hand with us in their real appearing in the Field, being near 20000 Men Superior in Number to us in *Flanders*, and in Proportion every where else.

But Providence ended not here, for having scattered the Confederate Army in *Spain*, the Embarrassing their Councils, follow'd in an unexpected Blow upon their Affairs, which has

cut out Work for our Politicians, which few yet can see the End of. This was the unexpected Death of the Emperour, to the Surprise of both Parties.

The first Step taken by the Confederates upon this Event, was to declare their Resolutions to nominate the King of Spain, Char. III. to the Empire, and as far as Possible to influence the several Electors to chuse him, and this Part has succeeded.

All the use France made of this Juncture, has been to oblige the Allies to recal Prince Eugene and about 14000 of the Confederate Troops, from the Army in Flanders, to serve on the Rhine, in order to prevent the Elector of Bavaria with the French Army on the Rhine, Invading the Empire, and pushing into Bavaria with the French, made a great Noise and Appearance of Undertaking, but intended nothing less.

When the News of the Death of the Emperor came to be seriously weighed in the several Courts of Christendome, the Effects it had there, were as various as the several Interests of those Princes guided them ; nor had the Confederates every where the same Sentiments. I have not room here to enlarge upon the particular Politicks of every respective Court, and the Measures taken or resolved to be taken thereupon, only thus far I may be particular.

The *Dutch*, tho' with their aims no doubt at a good Peace, spoke *A-la-Cavalier*, talk'd big and threatn'd nothing but War; all their Discourses were of carrying on the War with Vigour, speedy recruiting their Troops, posting their whole Army on the Frontiers, and in the conquer'd Towns, raising new Magazines of Forrage; reducing the Princes of the North to a Peace, the better to carry on the War against *France and the like.*

But the *English Court*, whether it were that they had then concert'd it with the *Dutch*, or whether it was that they saw further into their own Affairs than other People thought they did, discover'd different Sentiments: They foresaw that the Death of the Emperour would produce other Events in *Europe*, than might yet appear; that all the Issue of carrying on the War, could but be one of these two hard Cases, either by any Disadvantage in the Field, to make *France* lift up her self, and refuse to concede the same Articles of Peace she had already offer'd; or by pushing *France* to the Extremity, cause her to evacuate the Dominions of *Spain* to the Emperour, and whether that would add to *Europe's* Peace at last, it might not be in the Reach of Humane Knowledge to determine. These Considerations as well as the Willingness to obtain a lasting Quiet to a Nation long wasted by this Cruel and Expensive War, seem to me to be
the

the main moving Reasons, why the British Court appear'd at least more inclined to a Treaty than some other of the Allies; I name none, this being written rather to explain things at home, than give Offence abroad.

I need not run on here to tell you, that the French finding the English more inclin'd, as they call it, to hear Reason, than they thought the Dutch to be, send over Agents, or Managers, to make proposals; which Proposals are made publick; they are sign'd by Monsieur Mesnager, an Agent, as it is said, of Monsieur Torcy, and being receiv'd here, are, by Her Majesty's Order, communicated to the Foreign Ministers, in Order to be sent by them to their Principals, our Allies: And for a more free communicating the Councils and Measures on both sides, relating to the Affair, My Lord Str----rd, Her Majesty's Plenipotentiary to the States General, is sent over to the Hague, to lay the whole Matter open to the States.

From these Proceedings the several Speculations of the Times are derived, which these Sheets are calculated a little to regulat, and a little to cut short some People, who run too fast from Information to Observation, and from Observation to Reflection; and in all perhaps unjust and imprudent.

The First Objection we meet with is, That these Negotiations, as they call them, are pri-

adtherefore what they call clandestine. But this is answer'd, *First*, By saying that all these Negotiations amount to no more than receiv-ing Proposals from the Enemy as is said; and *Secondly*, By asking whether it is not as fair and above-board, honourable and consistent with the Grand Alliance (the eighth Article where-of they make so much Noise about) that we may, or do receive Proposals of Peace from the French, and communicate them to the Dutch, as that the Dutch should receive Proposals of Peace from the French, and communicate them to us.

Some who say that is not a sufficient Answer, alledge, That the French Agent, Monsieur ---- has been kept here some time, and seve-ral Conferences have been had with him, which are not communicated to the Dutch: Now, as this is a Suggestion not yet proved, it cannot receive a particular Answer: But this might serve to stop the Mouth of that Suggestion: Suppose the same Agent was once entertain'd three Months in Holland upon the same Subject, and that before the late Treaty there was pro-ced; and the English were never made ac-quainted with it by the Dutch at all: Was the Effect of the Private Conferences with him there, any thing the more to our Prejudice for that? Or do we esteem the Treaty ever the more broken for that? And if either of these things

things be true, or not true; while the Result of all is made publick to the Confederates, why should we amuse our selves with it?

But as we begin to be silenc'd in the Affair of a clandestine Negotiation, we open the wider on the Subject of the Treaty it self, and say we are entring into an Unsafe, Inglorious, Dishonourable Peace; that we will give up *Spain*, which is the thing we have been fighting so long for: That to give *Spain* to King *Philip* is giving it to King *Lewis*; and that to give it to him is to make him Universal Monarch: That the End of the War is defeated; the great Article, for which so much Blood has been spilt, is given up: That this is betraying the Confederacy, abandoning the Liberties of *Europe*, sacrificing the *Protestant Interest*, and the like.

These are fair Pretences indeed, as to the Government: What measures they may take, it is not for me, or any Writer of a Pamphlet to say. But that nothing of this Matter is yet seen in the Government Proceedings, or any thing like it, is manifest; nothing at all being yet done by Her Majesty, or her Ministers, but just hearing the Proposals which *France* has made, and communicating them to be consider'd of by the Allies; and this is done so publick and so above-board, that not only the Allies have them, but every News-paper has printed them; they are handed about Street, and

the wise Sentiments of our Politicians are heard of them every Day.

This is the farthest that Matter of Fact can extend, because it is the farthest that any thing yet has been done; yet since our Common People, or at least those who endeavour to animate them against the present Ministry, are so warm against this part of a Treaty, it may not be amiss to state the Case here as it relates to the Spanish Monarchy, and to that great Question, who it shall be allotted to by the ensuing Treaty.

There are but Two Competitors for it in the World at this time: It had been to be wish'd there were more to claim it. The Competitors are Charles VI. now Emperour of Germany, and by us declar'd King of Spain; and Philip V. Grandson of the King of France, and by both us England (Mark that) and the Dutch acknowledged and owned as King of Spain. As to the King of France, he has not only, in the Old Treaty of the Pyrenees, renounc'd it, but in his New Proposals for a Treaty he owns it is not safe for Europe that it should be annex'd to the Crown of Spain; and, in short, does not pretend to it.

It remains then as the only Question, to whom it shall be allotted. All those who are for carrying on the War, are among those hinted at before, who are for giving it entirely to the Emperour, without any regard to that Breach

of the Ballance of *Europe*, which must be the Consequence. It is needless to set down here the Kingdoms which an Emperour of *Germany* and King of *Spain*, centering in one Person, would possess; it is enough to say, that such a Prince, being himself of a Martial Genius, Forward, and Ambitious, would be more likely to oppres and over-run *Europe* by far now, than either of those Princes in the same Nation were, before him, who actually did it; or than the K. of *France* ever yet was, or than the K. of *France*, as now reduced, could be in a hundred Years, though *Spain* were to be added to him.

Nor is it very material to look back into the Management of those Emperours, who have builded upon the Union of the Spanish Dominions, any further than this, to tell you that even *France* it self was summon'd in by all the Protestant Princes, to prevent the *Austrian* Monarch over-running *Europe*, at least three or four times; and all had not done neither, if *Gustavus Adolphus*, the King of *Sweden*, had not at last finished the Ruin of the *Austrian* Tyranny, and put the Princes of *Germany* in such a condition to assert their own Liberties, as ended in the Famous Treaties of *Munster* and *Westphalia*, which are the constituted Foundations of all the present Treaties of *Europe*, that relate to the Empire, *France*, *Holland*, *Spain*, or *Swedland*.

It might not indeed be altogether useless to enumerate a few of the Bloody Effects of the Cruelty and Tyranny of the *Austrian* Greatness in those Days; not in the least to reflect upon his Imperial Majesty that now is, whose Personal Vertues and particularly his Clemency, Justice, and Piety are remarkably Eminent; but we are in this speaking by way of just Caution to Futurity; it is no Reproaching the August House of *Austria*, much less the present Illustrious Branch of that House who possesses the Imperial Throne, to relate what Authentick History has recorded, for us and future Ages to look back upon; or to suggest, that there may arise in after Ages, Princes upon that Throne, who not Inheriting the Vertues and Moderation of his present Imperial Majesty, may Exercise that Power to that Oppression and Ruin of the Liberties of *Europe*, and to the Destruction of the *Protestant* Interest.

History gives us Three Periods when the *Austrian* Greatness, was exerted to the Oppression of the *Protestant* Interest, and of the Liberties of the rest of *Europe*; I shall but name them, referring to History for the fuller Account of the Particulars, in every one of which, such Dangers may appear, as may be a sufficient Warning to any *Protestant* Nation, against being assistant in any Manner, to raise again such a Monster in *Europe*.

1. The First was in the Resolution openly declared by Char. V. Emperour of Germany, and King of Spain, against the Protestant Religion in Germany : The Council of Trent, had made several Decrees and Resolutions, to the Prejudice of the Protestants ; which occasioned the famous Treaty of Smalcalde, in the Year 1546. The Emperour held a Dyet at Ratisbone, where he proposed that the Protestants should submit to the Decrees of the Council of Trent; which they refused and the Emperour taking upon him the *Crusado*, as it might well be called, Arms against them. The War begun with great Fury, and the Protestants at the Battel of Mulbergh were ruin'd in it; the Great Duke of Saxony taken, and used most Barbarously in Prison, Insulted and Depos'd : The Landgrave of Hess Cassel Condemn'd to perpetual Imprisonment, after a Capitulation for his Liberty. The Blood, the Devastation, the Cruelty and Rapins committed in this Religious War are inexpressible, and if Francis the First of France had not Interposed, and God struck the Emperour with Sickness, the Protestant Religion in all probability, had been Extirpated in Germany, as it indeed was in the End, in Bohemia, Austria, Moravia.

2. The Second Attempt against the Protestant Religion, was in the Time of Philip II. the Son of that Emperour ; whose Greatness deriv'd from that fatal Union of Germany with Spain.

Spain; and this was, the Introducing the *Spaniſh Inquisition* into the *Low Countries*. This gave Birth to that famous War in the *Low Countries*, which ended by God's good Providence in the Liberty of five Provinces, which are now the *States General*, and in removing the Duke *D' Alva* and the *Inquisition*. How be it, this was not finish'd under Forty Years War, in the first Part of which, the Cruelty, the Butchery, and the Murthering in cold Blood the Prime Nobility, and Citizens of that Country, was such, as can scarce meet with a Parallel in the *Christian World*, for an Account of which, the Reader is referr'd to that excellent Historian *Famianus Strada*, who tho' a *Papist*, speaks of it with utmost Abhorrence.

I omit here the Attempt of the same *Philip II.* to extirpate the *Protestant Religion* in *England* by his famous Invasion of 1588, as also his several Attempts against the *Protestants* of *France* under *Henry IV.* not that they were not eminent Instances of this thing, but because they are too long for this Tract.

3. The Third Period of *Austrian Greatness*, and its Attack upon the *Protestant Religion* was in the Reign of *Ferdinand II. Emperour of Germany*, when the *Protestants* were reduced to the lowest Ebb, by the famous General *Tilly*; when *Magdeburgh* was taken by Storm, barbarously Sack'd and Burnt, and 17000 People,

Men, Women and Children put to the Sword, without Respect to Age, Sex, or Condition, all the Princes of the *Lower Saxony*, were reduced and obliged to renounce the Conclusions of *Leipsick*, and the Emperour had Issued out his Decrees Imperial to oblige all the *Protestants* in the whole Empire, to give up all the Churches and Ecclesiastick Immunites to the *Papists*. Victorious *Tilly*, had ravaged *Hessia* and *Thuringia*, was marching to reduce the Electors of *Saxony* and *Brandenburg*, and was already enter'd *Saxony*, where he was met by the King of *Sweden* at the famous Plains of *Leipsick*, and entirely overthrown; from which Battle, the *German Liberty* dates its Restoration, and in the Process of which War, the *Austrian Greatness* was effectuallly reduced.

And shall we now be blam'd, that we are not willing to restore this Exorbitant Greatness to the House of *Austria*! The Wars of *Germany*, if the Accounts Printed in *Germany* are to be depended upon, laid Waste at several times Two Third Parts of the Empire, destroy'd Seven Millions of People, and lasted from the Years 1617 to 1648, when all that Breach was Healed in the famous Treaty of *Westphalia*.

Thus much for the giving *Spain* to the House of *Austria*, come we now to Enquire into the probable Consequences of giving the *Spanish Monarchy* to *Philip V.* who now Possesses it.

It is not for me to say, that by a War we may, or may not recover it from him, in spight of all the Opposition both he and his Grandfather can make, I will not doubt our future Success any more than we have had reason to doubt our past.

But if after we should have done this, and have brought the King of *France* to consent entirely to an Evacuation, we should then find it as dangerous to give it to the Person we conquer it for, as to leave it with the Person we have conquered it from; what account shall we give either to God or our Posterity for the Blood and Treasure spent in this War?

This is an Argument which will at least make it worth our while to consider, as we go on, what we are doing, or rather before we go on, what we are going about: And this I really take to be the true Reason why the present Government of this Nation are for a Treaty at this time; and I must acknowledge it is a Testimony to me beyoud any I have seen, that the Persons now at the Helm go upon Principles of Justice and Prudence; if I Wrong them I shall be very sorry for their own sakes; I am sure I do not flatter them.

If, when we should have conquer'd *Spain*, it may not be safe to give it up into the hands we fight for: For God's sake, Good People, what do we make War for? Is this Nation so rich,

so great, so at ease; that we want to make war
merely to spend our Money and destroy our
Men! Shall we fight for *Spain* to give it back
again to them we take it from? It is much more
to the purpose to consider this before-hand.

It seems plain from what has been laid, it
may be very hazardous to give it to the House
of *Austria*; let us then inquire if it may be safe
to give it to him that has it.

The Objections are confin'd to these two; 1. He is an Heir, tho' remote to the Crown of *France*, and may come to be Next Heir. 2. He is in the Interest of *France*; and to give it to him is to give it to *France*. For the first of these, That he is an Heir; it is so remote, that it is really not worth mentioning, since his Elder Brother is alive, and has a Son alive, and his Wife with Child young and breeding more. To which may be added no Doubt, a Renunciation in Favour of his younger Brother the Duke of *Berry*. And tho' 'tis true, the Renunciation of Kingdoms is not esteemed very significant in Princes, who have power to act against them; and this might be a good Argument from *France* to *Spain*; yet it will hardly hold in arguing from *Spain* to *France*, because there is not equal Danger from a Weak Prince and Kingdom to a Strong, as there is from a Stronger to a Weaker. Again; as K. Philip has a Son, there is no room for a Suggestion of a like nature in the

Succession of France to Spain.

The next, and indeed the only Argument of Weight, is that of Interest, thus; That the Obligations of K. Philip to the K. of France are indissoluble; such as, besides the Ties of Nature, the Obligation of owing his Crown to him, as he not made him King only, but twice replac'd him there when driven away by his Enemies; and indeed the carrying on a War principally for him, at the Expence of so many Millions, and in a Kind at the Hazard of his whole Kingdom of France.

I will freely own these are deep Debts, strong Obligations; and in Honour and Gratitude K. Philip cannot but be in the Interest of his Grandiather as long as he lives. But let us inquire here into some things, which may take off the Force of these Obligations, as to the Argument before us

1. In a Treaty to establish K. Philip, may not such Limitations, Provisions, and Restrictions, be made, and that with the Consent of France, as may for the future make K. Philip entirely dependant upon the Allies, and independant upon France?

2. Will not the K. of France, to establish his Grandson, rather give him up so far to the Confederates, as to make him their entire Ally and Confederate, than not give him a quiet Possession of his Kingdom?

3. A firm Peace being established between the 3 Crowns, may not this be so far from an Injury to *France*, that it will seem to preserve that Alliance and Peace, if *France* be at all sincere in making it ?

4. May not this Dependance of *Spain* upon the Confederates, consist so much in the preserving and supporting *Spain* in the peaceable Possession of all its remote Possessions from any Invader, as well *German*, or even hereafter of *French*, as may make it the Advantage of *Spain* to continue it.

Again in a Treaty to establish *Philip V.* may not such Securities be given to *Britain* and *Holland*, for the Safety of their Commerce, as may put them out of Danger of any Encroachment from *France*, and will not King *Philip* find it his Interest, to give those Securities.

Some Observations on this Head of Trade may explain this.

1. It is most certain, that the National Interest of *Spain* and *France*, can never Unite, by National Interest are understood.

1. Those of Dominion.

2. Those of Commerce,

Those of Dominion are too many and too long to mention here, and respect the *Spanish* Possessions in *Flanders* and *Italy*, where it can never be the Interest of *Spain* to let *France* let her Foot, but of that I cannot enlarge here.

Only I may say, that as two Kingdoms, they will be ever Jealous of one another in both these Places , nor will the relative Obligation last a Moment longer than the Life of the present King of France, for Interest of State always prevails against Interest of Blood, and Brothers will no longer agree, than their Governments agree.

But, come we next to the Interest of Commerce, and here we know, let King Philip desire, or design what he will, the People of Spain can never, nay the Government of Spain can never either agree with France, or differ with England and Holland.

1. The French in Trade can do nothing to engage Spain, nor any thing but to injure and impoverish her: This appears in two Things, First, France cannot take off any one thing of the Produce of Spain, which is considerable. The Wine, the Brandy, the Oil, the Fruit of Spain, with which so great a Trade is driven to England and Holland ; in France it must all go to the Dunghill, they could not tell what else to do with it, even the Wool, they can in France make use but of a very small Part of it. But as to Wine, Oil, Fruit &c. The Southern Part of France abound with them, and supply almost all the rest of this Part of the World.

2. The French taking the Liberty of Trade to the Spanish West Indies, is a Grievance Spain

it self will never bear ; and France must give it up, or I question much, if Philip could ever maintain himself upon his Throne, even Spain it self would fly in his Face, and fly to the Confederates for help to dislodge them.

These two things, if there were no other, will make Philip as much a Spaniard in one Year after a Peace, as he is by the Necessity of the War a French-man now : perhaps indeed Duty and the Debt above mentioned, may tend to preserve a Deference and Regard from King Philip to France, during the Life of his Grandfather; and how far will this carry him, truly only to represent in Civil and obliging Dutiful Terms, what his Subjects insist on, and to request his Grandfather to make him easy on the Throne, he exalted him to, by keeping up the Boundaries of the Nations from any Encroachments, that the Spaniards may not complain, that instead of being Subjects to a King of Spain, they are Vassals to, and dependent upon a King of France.

But if there be any Occasion for any Thing of this kind, after the Decease of the present King of France, and King Philip comes to solicit these things of his Brother, Lewis XV. he will then talk in another Stile, Demand them of Right, insist upon the Demand, and do him self Justice if deny'd ; if the French shall resent it, and attempt to force him to any Compliance ; What then ?

then? He immediately has recourse to *England* and *Holland*, and so you are as you were in the World.

The Sum of this Matter is, we have nothing to do, but to tye up *France* to Securities against Encroachments, and upon who? not upon the Confederates, for that will be sufficiently secured by Surrender of Towns, Barriers, and Frontiers; but against Encroachment upon *Spain*, that King *Philip* may be a free Prince, entirely Independent upon *France*, and then leave the Interest of his Kingdom to Work the rest. There is no Room left to argue it, the Natural Cosequences of his being King of *Spain*, will be, that he shall be an Enemy to *France*, the National Interests of the Two Kingdoms are Incompatible and cannot be Reconciled, they never were, they never can be brought to Consist with one another.

It might be expected, that I should add the natural Antipathies of the People, which in all things, have so separated the *Spaniards* from the *French*, that the Aversions which proceed from thence, are considerably Instrumental in propagating a Separation of Interest. But I do not think this to material an Article as some People imagin, the Policy of *France*, may go a great way to Naturalize the Nations one to another, and to remove those Natural Aversions, introducing themselves gradually, and bringing the *Spaniards* off by Art and Management from their Stiffness.

and Formalities, and by little and little, accustoming them to the Manners and Fashions of their Neighbours. I do not therefore lay so great Stress upon the natural Antipathies of the French and Spaniards one to another, as some People do; at the same time, I do not deny, but such things may Influence something in this Case, and sway the People by their Inclination with the more readiness to fall in with their real Interest, when it suits their National Temper as much as it does their Interest.

But when we come to speak of the Political and Real Interest of a Nation, the Article of Inclination and Temper in the People, is a thing so trifling, as it need have no Influence in the Case. The Interest of Spain as to Trade, can never agree with that of France. The Latter indeed may agree with the Former, France may gain by a Trade with the Spaniards, as they make a happy return of Plate, Bullion, and Ready Money, for what they carry to Spain; but Spain would starve, and be undone.

The only advantageous Trade Spain can drive in the World, out of themselves, is to England and to Holland: Hither they export 30000 Pipes of Canary, 5000 Butts of Sherry, and 10000 Pipes of Tent, Alicant, Malaga, and Barcelona Wines, a year: Hither they load a vast Quantity of Oil, of Fruit, of Indico, and of Cocheneal, which France can do little in, or take little or nothing of.

If then in the Treaty making, or to be made, France can offer any Securities against undue Encroachments upon the Commerce of Spain, in order to give a new turn to the Advantage of France.

If our Commerce thither can be secured in its Native Course and Freedom without Interruption, Partiality, and Imposition.

If Civil Encroachments are provided against in the Government of Spain, and the French kept out of the Spanish West Indies.

If all these things can be adjusted with France, and every thing left to its Native Channel, there is no need for us to be alarm'd at the giving Spain and the Indies to K. Philip: For the Interest of Trade, of Government, and of Policy, will all run against France; the Nation will be as much ours as ever; and K. Philip and his Posterity be as much Spaniards in a very short time as ever Philip II. was, or any of his other Predecessors.

